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1 Introduction 
 
Endurantism is the thesis that objects persist by being wholly located 
at distinct times. At any rate, this is one fairly standard way of 
characterizing the view.1 It’s well-known that trouble arises when one 
attempts to spell out exactly what it means to be wholly located at some 
time, but I won’t pursue those interesting issues here. I will simply take the 
wholly located at relation to be the primitive and fundamental location 
relation of Hudson (2005 and 2008a-b).2 
Critics sometimes press endurantists on the problem of temporary 
intrinsics—i.e., the problem of how a single object like Socrates, who may 
be standing at one time and sitting at another, can have apparently 
incompatible intrinsic properties, like being straight and being bent.3 Many 
endurantists have tried to dissolve this problem by relativizing properties 
to times, or by adopting some cousin of this strategy.4 
                                               
1 Though see Gilmore (2004, ch. 2) for two different ways to draw the endurantist/perdurantist 
divide. The terms ‘endurantism’ and ‘perdurantism’ are due to Johnston (1984).  
2 For a critical discussion of Hudson’s view, see Parsons (2008).  
3 Lewis (1986, 202-4) and Sider (2001, 92-8) are both influential presentations of the problem.  
4  See Haslanger (2003) and Kurtz (2006) for overviews of the options.  
2 
But the relativizing-to-times trick soon gives way to a relativizing-
to-regions trick when time travel is introduced, because time travel permits 
a changing object to visit its past self, and so to have apparently 
incompatible properties at the same time. And more recently, even region-
relativization has suffered counterexamples in the form of ‘self-colocation’ 
or ‘spooky coincidence’ cases (Gilmore 2004, 190; Carroll 2011; Pruss 2017; 
Wasserman 2018, 199-203; Simon 20195). These are cases where 
“things…travel back in time and pass through their former selves” (Simon 
2019, 135). When the time-travelling object passes through itself, it can have 
apparently incompatible properties at the very same spatiotemporal region. 
So, endurantists have been pressed to seek alternatives to region 
relativization.6 
While cases of self-colocation thus generate a particularly difficult 
variant of the problem of temporary intrinsics, in this paper I will argue that 
they also pose another problem for the endurantist. We will see that it is 
very difficult for the endurantist to say exactly what self-colocation is. In 
what follows, I develop this problem for endurantism and discuss a number 
of prima facie tempting solutions that, in my view, ultimately fail. Then I 
suggest a solution which I think is more promising, but which requires 
denying that apparent cases of self-colocation are genuine cases of self-
colocation.7 
  
2 A Colocation Puzzle 
  
Consider the following case. Casper the ghost hops into a time 
machine and travels back to a past time that we can dub t1 to visit his 
younger self. In this way, Casper comes to be multilocated at t1. Though 
                                               
5 Simon cites APA comments by John Hawthorne as the source of these cases.  
6 These opening paragraphs follow Wasserman’s (2018, ch. 6.3) outline of the temporary intrinsics 
dialectic.  
7 Self-colocation is one of many conceivable exotica at the intersection of mereology and location. 
For an overview, see Gilmore (2014) and the introduction to Kleinschmidt (2014).  
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endurantists reject this view, it will sometimes be convenient to speak as 
though there are two distinct objects occupying the disjoint regions Casper 
occupies at t1: younger Casper, who has not yet travelled in time, and older 
Casper, who has just arrived at t1 from the future. It will also make for 
smoother going if we assume that Casper inhabits a Newtonian manifold, 
but nothing of substance hangs on this.  
At t1, younger Casper is exactly located at a region r1, and older 
Casper is exactly located at a region r2, disjoint from r1. But now imagine 
that, as time passes, older Casper leaves r2 and traces a continuous path 
through space until, at a later time, t2, he comes to occupy r1, the same 
region that is (still) occupied by younger Casper. Thus, older Casper 
apparently comes to be coincident with his past self.8  
Similar cases have been described by other authors. Cody Gilmore 
(2004, 190) asks us to imagine an ethereal particle looping around a “self-
intersecting timelike curve” to intercept itself; and Wasserman discusses a 
similar case involving a time-travelling boson (2018, 201; cf. 206-7).9 Simon 
(2019) has developed a particularly clever case featuring a 
commissurotomy patient.  
Prima facie, these are all instances of a special variety of coincidence 
or colocation, namely: self-colocation. That is, they seem to be cases where 
an object colocates with itself. This is clearly Wasserman’s view, and 
Simon’s term “spooky coincidence” suggests that he, too, thinks of these 
cases as cases of self-colocation or self-coincidence. To see how natural this 
interpretation is, suppose (following other authors) that younger Casper is 
happy and older Casper is sad. Then it is tempting to think that a happy 
thing and a sad thing colocate at r1 at t2. But it also seems that both happy 
                                               
8 The case is adapted from Simon (2019), who in turn cites APA comments by John Hawthorne. I’m 
following Simon in speaking for convenience of younger Casper and older Casper as though they 
were distinct objects.  
9 For discussion of whether bosons can colocate, see the exchange between Cortes (1976), Barnette 
(1978), Ginsberg (1981), and Teller (1983).  
 
4 
Casper and sad Casper are identical to Casper, so if happy and sad Casper 
colocate at r1 at t2, then Casper is apparently colocated with himself.  
But what exactly is self-colocation? What does being self-colocated 
at some region amount to? This question leads to trouble for the 
endurantist. To see this, let’s adopt “singular location” as a moniker for the 
ordinary, mundane way in which objects occupy spacetime. An object is 
singularly located only if it occupies some region, it is not colocated with 
anything else at that region, it is not multilocated at simultaneous regions, 
and so on.10 Since self-colocation is a variety of colocation, self-colocation is 
something different than mere singular location. But what is the difference? 
What, e.g., is the difference between Casper’s being self-colocated at r1 at 
t2 and Casper’s being singularly located at r1 at t2? This turns out to be a 
very difficult question for the endurantist to answer.  
To see why, start by reflecting on colocation in general, rather than 
self-colocation in particular. Facts about colocation are not brute facts, but 
rather obtain in virtue of what I will call simple location facts, where a simple 
location fact is a fact that consists in a single object standing in a single 
instance of the location relation to a single spatiotemporal region (or a 
spatial region at a given time). For example, if two objects a and b are 
colocated at r, this seems to be in virtue of the simple location fact that a is 
located at r and the simple location fact that b is located at r. And 
presumably, varying whether an object is colocated or only singularly 
located at some region will always require varying the simple location facts 
on which colocation depends. No difference in facts about colocation 
without a difference in facts about simple location.11 
            Since self-colocation is a kind of colocation, if Casper is self-colocated 
at r1 at t2, then this fact obtains in virtue of simple location facts, and these 
latter facts would be different in some way if Casper were merely singularly 
located at r1 at t2 instead. What then are the facts in virtue of which Casper 
                                               
10 Among the further conditions one might want to add are these: it is not interpenetrating with any 
other objects and it is not an extended simple.  
11 Thanks to a referee for suggesting the use of a supervenience principle.  
5 
is self-colocated at r1 at t2? Just as a pair of distinct objects a and b are 
colocated at r at t in virtue of the fact that a is located at r at t and b is located 
at r at t, so it seems that Casper will be self-colocated at r1 at t2 in virtue of 
the fact that Casper is located at r1 at t2 and the fact that… Casper is located 
at r1 at t2. But those are the same fact, so all we really have is the fact that 
Casper is located at r1 at t2. And surely in that situation Casper is only 
singularly located at r1 at t2.12  
So, an initial attempt to spell out what self-colocation amounts to 
seems to expose it as incoherent instead.13 As a variety of colocation, self-
colocation must be different than singular location. And yet, there does not 
seem to be any difference. But the argument for the latter claim tacitly 
presupposed endurantism, for it assumed that Casper is wholly, rather than 
partly, located at r1 at t2. If we drop this assumption and adopt the 
perdurantist’s ontology instead, then it turns out that there is a 
straightforward account of self-colocation available.14 
 
                                               
12 A referee suggests that cases like Casper’s seem like successful counterexamples to the principle 
that facts about colocation obtain in virtue of simple location facts. Fair enough, but I do not share 
that intuition myself. Perhaps one reason to hesitate before concluding that cases like Casper’s are 
successful counterexamples to the principle in question is the availability of an alternative 
interpretation of those cases as special cases of singular location - an interpretation that I will 
ultimately recommend to the endurantist below. Even at this stage of the discussion there is 
something to be said for this alternative interpretation. Self-colocation already differs from standard 
colocation in at least one of the same ways that singular location does: it involves only one object 
(various readers have made this or related points). And if we deny that self-colocation obtains in 
virtue of simple location facts, this will only further decrease the resemblance between self-
colocation and standard colocation, while increasing the resemblance between self-colocation and 
singular location. 
13 For a related but distinct puzzle about motion, see Kleinschmidt (2017).  
14 Though I will speak only of perdurantism, what I say in this section could be reframed in terms 
of its close cousin, stage theory, which is defended by authors such as Hawley (2001) and Sider 
(2001).  
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3 A Perdurantist Solution 
 
On perdurantism, younger Casper at r1 at t2 and older Casper at r1 
at t2 can be understood as distinct proper parts of Casper. The first step to 
developing this proposal was taken by Sider (2001, 101ff.), who discusses 
an imaginary case in which he travels back in time to visit his younger self, 
so that there are two spatially separated Sider-like objects in the same room 
at once. Sider argues that the perdurantist should interpret these objects as 
distinct spatial parts of a single temporal part - spatial parts that are 
intrinsically just like ordinary temporal parts of Sider, and fail to qualify as 
temporal parts only because they exist simultaneously. 
Applying this idea to the story of Casper, when older Caspar arrives 
from the future at t1, there are two spatially separated instantaneous 
ghostlike objects at t1, each of which is a proper part of Casper. At each 
moment after t1, there is another instantaneous pair of such objects, which 
are increasingly close together as older Casper approaches younger Casper, 
until complete coincidence occurs at r1 at t2. But should the perdurantist 
say that there really are two instantaneous ghostlike objects colocated at r1 
at t2, or should she say that there is actually just one? If we continue to 
imagine that younger Casper is happy and older Casper is sad, then she 
should say that there are two. For one of the traditional advantages of 
perdurantism is that it allows for apparently incompatible temporary 
intrinsic properties like happy/sad to really be incompatible temporary 
intrinsic properties, never had by the very same object. So, in keeping with 
this perdurantist tradition, the perdurantist should say that there is a happy 
ghostlike object at r1 at t2 colocated with a distinct, sad ghostlike object at 
r1 at t2.15  
                                               
15 What should the perdurantist say in a case where younger and older Casper are intrinsic 
duplicates? I think that she should say there is only one instantaneous ghostlike object at r1 at t2, 
because positing two would be ontologically extravagant. In the case where younger casper is happy 
and older Casper is sad, the persistence of younger Casper at r1 causes a happy ghostlike object to 
occupy r1 at t2, while the movement of older Casper toward r1 causes a sad ghostlike object to 
7 
One might worry that this proposal will violate extensionality, 
which claims that any objects x and y share all of the same parts iff they are 
identical. For it might seem that the happy ghostlike object and the sad 
ghostlike object at r1 at t2 share all of the same parts, and so they cannot be 
construed as distinct proper parts of Casper without running afoul of 
extensionality - a consequence that most perdurantists won’t accept.16  
But the perdurantist can deny that the ghostly objects at r1 at t2 have 
all of the same parts. Since we are imagining ethereal objects that are 
disposed to interpenetrate, I think that the most natural way to interpret 
what is going on at moments where they occupy overlapping regions is that 
they spatially overlap without mereologically overlapping. So, when t2 
arrives, there are two instantaneous ghostlike objects colocated at r1 
without sharing any parts. This will be a case of colocation by 
interpenetration rather than a case of the matter-sharing variety of 
colocation which perdurantists typically eschew anyway.17 
On this account, the two instantaneous ghostlike objects at r1 at t2 
don’t share any parts in common, so there is no violation of extensionality. 
If these ghostlike objects are simples, then their respective improper parts 
are distinct, where this distinctness is plausibly a brute fact. (I take it the 
distinctness of any two or more simples is a brute fact.) So there is no 
                                               
occupy r1 at t2. But if old and younger Casper are (say) both happy, then the more parsimonious 
proposal is that there is one happy ghostlike object at r1 at t2 whose existence at that location is 
overdetermined by the persistence of younger Casper and the motion of older Casper. There won’t 
be any genuine colocation going on at r1 at t2, but it isn’t clear that this is a cost, for it is in keeping 
with how the perdurantist handles (some) other coincidence cases. The typical perdurantist says that 
some regions which seem to be occupied by distinct, colocated objects are in fact occupied by a 
single, shared temporal part of two or more (non-colocated) objects.  
16 Thanks to a referee for this objection.  
17 Granted, allowing interpenetration entails either that supersunstantivalism is false, or that regions 
themselves can interpenetrate. Some perdurantists will not be happy with this, but others won’t be 
bothered at all. I take it that this issue is largely independent of perdurantism itself. For more on 
interpenetration, see Gilmore (2014).  
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violation of extensionality.18 If the ghostlike objects are composites of 
instantaneous parts of some kind, then those parts themselves are distinct 
(though interpenetrating), and so again there is no violation of 
extensionality. Either way, the perdurantist can say that there are two 
instantaneous ghostlike objects colocated at r1 at t2. 
Now, if perdurantism is true, we often speak as if an object is located 
where any temporal part of that object is located. For example, we would 
say that I am sitting in this chair now even though only a small temporal 
part of me is sitting in (a small temporal part of) this chair now. Similarly, 
in cases like Casper’s, where two parts of Casper that are intrinsically just 
like temporal parts colocate, it seems appropriate to say that Casper is 
colocated with himself. Therefore, the perdurantist can make sense of self-
colocation cases by interpreting them as cases where two or more parts of a 
persisting object that are intrinsically just like temporal parts colocate at 
some region.19  
By contrast, the standard endurantist cannot say this, because her 
ontology does not include such things as temporal parts or objects 
intrinsically like temporal parts spread throughout a persisting object’s 
career. So the challenge for the endurantist is to give us a coherent account 
of self-colocation without appealing to the perdurantist’s resources. In the 
                                               
18 Anticipating either this response or at least a similar response, the referee worries that there will 
now be a violation of the Strong Supplementation axiom, which requires that, if one object x is not 
a part of another object y, then x has a part that doesn’t overlap y. But, while neither ghostlike object 
at r1 at t2 is part of the other, they do not violate Strong Supplementation because each ghostlike 
object does have a part that doesn’t overlap the other, namely, it’s improper part. Granted, these two 
improper parts are spatially coincident, but again, this doesn’t entail that they mereological overlap; 
they may be interpenetrating.  
19 As a referee observes, there may also be other options open to the perdurantist for making sense 
of self-colocation, since she might be able to extend her treatment of permanent material coincidence 
cases to apparent self-colocation cases. The endurantist, on the other hand, will probably find this 
sort of approach no more appealing as an account of self-colocation than as an account of permanent 
material coincidence.  
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next section, I will critically survey a number of ways the endurantist might 
try to accomplish this feat. 
 
4 Unsuccessful Endurantist Solutions 
  
First, it’s worth exploring whether the endurantist can mimic the 
perdurantist’s account of self-colocation but replace the perdurantist’s 
temporal-part-like objects with something else that fills the same role. To 
pull this off, the endurantist would need to posit multiple Casper-shaped 
objects that are coincident with each other at r1 at t2, and which, though not 
identical to Casper, can be loosely spoken about as if they were. If the 
endurantist can find such objects, she could cast self-colocation as the 
coincidence of these objects at some region.20 Provided that there is no such 
coincidence in cases of singular location, self-colocation will differ from 
singular location.   
What endurantist-friendly objects are there that could fill this role? 
Here’s an idea. Some metaphysicians think that certain objects are 
constituted by other objects, and, moreover, that the former are constituted 
by different objects at different times. For example, it is common to hold 
that a statue can be constituted by different lumps of clay at different times; 
or that an organism can be constituted by different fusions of particles at 
different times; and so on. A time travelling object that visits its past self 
might therefore be constituted by different objects at the same time. 
Presumably, if I were to travel back in time to visit myself at a younger age, 
younger me would be constituted by a different fusion of particles than 
older me. Then these distinct fusions of particles could colocate. So, perhaps 
cases of self-colocation are cases where distinct objects at some time t, each 
of which constitutes one and the same further object at t, are colocated. 
I don’t think this is going to work. Not every object which could 
plausibly be self-colocated is also plausibly constituted by another object. 
                                               
20 Simon (2019) may have something like this in mind when he refers to Casper’s ‘two coincident 
manifestations’ (135).  
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Casper himself might be one example. What, if anything, constitutes a 
ghost? There doesn’t seem to be any lump of material out of which a ghost 
is made. Nor is it typical to think of ghosts gaining and losing parts, which 
might otherwise tempt us to suggest that ghosts are constituted by, but not 
identical to, fusions of their parts. And even if ghosts are constituted by 
fusions of their parts, why think that they are constituted by different 
fusions at different times? If this business about ghosts seems silly, there 
are more serious cases. For example, surely mereologically simple, point-
sized particles are not constituted by any further object, and yet one can 
construct spooky coincidence cases featuring particles (e.g. Gilmore 2004, 
190; Wasserman 2018, 199-203).  
Or consider a case like this. Imagine that I am constituted by a certain 
fusion of particles, F, at a region r and time t. As time passes, I am 
constituted by different fusions of particles in succession, while the 
particles which are the parts of F each go their own way, becoming scattered 
throughout the biosphere. But then suppose that, by an enormous 
coincidence, I come to be constituted by F again at some later time, at the 
very instant I step into a time machine located at r that immediately 
transports me back to t, where I colocate with myself. Now younger me and 
older me are colocated, but also constituted by the same fusion of particles, 
namely, F. Once again, there are not two distinct, colocated objects which 
constitute me at t, so the constitution strategy fails to account for this case 
of self-colocation. Therefore, the constitution strategy at best falls short of a 
general account of self-colocation.  
Let’s try again. Jeffrey Brower’s (2010) neo-Aristotelian solution to 
the problem of temporary intrinsics may provide an endurantist substitute 
for person stages and their ilk in self-colocation cases. To explain how a 
persisting object can have apparently incompatible properties at different 
times, Brower hypothesizes that objects persist by successively colocating 
with momentary objects. For example, on Brower’s view, there are objects 
such as seated Socrates and standing Socrates, which are distinct from each 
other and which are confined to the times at which Socrates is sitting and 
standing, respectively. Socrates himself persists by successively colocating 
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with these objects. Thus, Socrates changes from sitting to standing by first 
colocating with sitting Socrates at t1, and then colocating with standing 
Socrates at t2.  
Perhaps a friend of Brower’s view could say that self-colocation 
occurs when a persisting object simultaneously colocates with two or more 
momentary objects which are themselves colocated. So, returning to 
Casper, and supposing again that younger Casper is happy and older 
Casper is sad, we might say that the momentary objects happy Casper and 
sad Casper are colocated at r1 at t2, and that Casper himself colocates with 
both of them at t2. In this way, Casper self-colocates.  
But once again, I fear this won’t account for all of the possible cases 
of self-colocation. For suppose that younger and older Casper do not have 
different moods (happy/sad), but rather are intrinsic duplicates. Then 
presumably there will be just one momentary object at r1 at t2, rather than 
two or more different, colocated momentary objects. If Casper is happy 
throughout his entire life, then there will be a happy Casper at r1 at t2, but 
no sad Casper colocated with happy Casper. But if Casper time travelled 
back to t2 and interpenetrated his past self at r1, then presumably he is self-
colocated there in spite of there being no difference in properties like 
happy/sad. So, this account of self-colocation, like the constitution account 
above, doesn’t accommodate all of the possible cases.21 
Our attempt to mimic the perdurantist account of self-colocation is 
not going well. A different strategy we might try concedes that there is just 
one Casper-shaped object at r1 at t2, namely, Casper himself, but argues 
that Casper is somehow located at r1 at t2 twice over.22 
                                               
21 One might push back by resisting the claim that there would only be one momentary object at r1 
at t2 in the case just described. Why couldn’t there be two such objects which were intrinsically just 
alike—a happy Casper colocated with another happy Casper? I think this proposal suffers from a 
problem that I will press against duplication proposals below, by appealing to overdetermination.  
22 Thanks to a referee for this suggestion. Simon (2019, 124) uses the language of being located at 
a region twice over in his discussion of self-colocation cases, but it’s unclear whether he means to 
be suggesting the strategy I pursue here under that description.  
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One way to pursue this thought is to propose that Casper’s being 
located at r1 at t2 occurs twice over in some hypertemporal or hyperspatial 
dimension.23 Then the difference between singular location and self-
colocation is a matter of how many hyper-locations there are at which 
Casper is located at r1 at t2: if Casper is located at r1 at t2 at just one hyper-
location, or at no hyper-locations at all, then Casper is at most merely 
singularly located at r1 at t2; but if Casper is located at r1 at t2 at two or 
more hyper-locations, then Casper is self-colocated at r1 at t2.  
Simon (2019) objects to proposals of this sort on the grounds that 
they are ontologically extravagant. Having argued that spooky coincidence 
may be nomically possible, he notes the implication that hyper-location 
proposals may require not merely that there are possible worlds containing 
hyperspace or hypertime, but that the actual world does, too.  
Nor will it do any good to say that Casper is located at r1 at t2 at two 
moments of Casper’s personal time.24 This strategy has been roundly 
criticized in related contexts (Sider 2001, 106; Carroll 2011; Wasserman 2018, 
202; Simon 2019, 136, n. 23). The main problem is that personal time is 
defined using events in external time, and so it cannot be used to 
distinguish what is not already distinct. Unless Casper is already located at 
r1 at t2 twice over, there cannot be distinct moments of personal time at 
which Casper is located at r1 at t2.   
            But maybe appeals to such things as hyper-dimensions and personal 
times is a red herring. Why not postulate duplicate location facts without 
indexing them to distinct hyperlocations? This strategy comes in many 
forms.25 For example, we could postulate tropes or particular instances of 
the location relation, and then claim that in singular location, there is just 
one trope or instance of the located at relation uniting Casper to r1 at t2, but 
in a case of self-colocation there are two tropes or instances of the located at 
                                               
23 Hud Hudson is one prominent hyperspace and hypertime theorist. See especially Hudson (2005) 
and (2014).  
24 The notion of personal time was introduced by Lewis (1976).  
25 Thanks to a referee for pointing out the many forms that it could take.  
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relation uniting Casper to r1 at t2. Those of us who reject tropes and their 
ilk might be happy instead with facts, states of affairs, or events. We could 
say that, in a case of singular location, there is just one fact, or state of affairs, 
or event, that consists of Casper’s being located at r1 at t2, but that in a case 
of self-colocation there are two duplicate facts, or states of affairs, or events, 
that each consist of Casper’s being located at r1 at t2.  
            This proposal suffers from a strange ontological extravagance that 
can be brought out best by considering classic cases of overdetermination. 
Imagine a subject, S, who is shot simultaneously by two snipers, each of 
whom has fired a fatal shot. In this case, two causal sequences eventuate in 
the death of S. And don’t let the term ‘overdetermination’ distract you. It 
seems that even if the two causal sequences are indeterministic—if, for 
example, a quantum fluke might have caused either of the snipers to miss—
nevertheless both causal sequences cause S’s death. But it would be 
extravagant to suppose that, because two causal sequences eventuate in S’s 
death, S suffers a kind of double-death, i.e., that there are two, duplicate, 
colocated events (or states of affairs, etc.) consisting of S’s dying.  
I say the same about cases of self-colocation. In the case of Casper, 
there are two causal sequences that eventuate in Casper’s being located at 
r1 at t2. The first is younger Casper’s persisting at r1; the second is older 
Casper’s moving from r2 toward r1. Whether deterministic or 
indeterministic, both of these causal sequences cause Casper to be located 
at r1 at t2. But just as it was extravagant to suppose that S suffered two 
colocated deaths when shot by two snipers, so it is extravagant to suppose 
that there are two colocated cases of Casper being located at r1 at t2 in our 
self-colocation case. So, this strategy is not a success either.  
  Let’s change tactics once more. Perhaps the difference between self-
colocation and singular location lies in facts about Casper’s history. We 
could say that Casper is self-colocated at r1 at t2 rather than singularly 
located at r1 at t2 in virtue of the historical fact that Casper arrived there via 
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two different routes, the second time by travelling back in time and passing 
through his younger self.26   
But I think that it is a mistake to look at times other than t2 to find 
what it is in virtue of which Casper is self-colocated at r1 at t2. To see why, 
we need to reflect once again on colocation in general, rather than self-
colocation in particular. Suppose a pair of objects, x and y, are colocated at 
r at t. As we saw above, it seems that all this requires is the simple location 
fact that x is located at r at t, and the simple location fact that y is located at 
r at t. And these facts do not seem to depend on what is going on at other 
times and places, or indeed, on anything extrinsic to r at t. To see this, recall 
that simple location facts consist of a single object standing in a single 
instance of the location relation to a single spatiotemporal region or region 
at a time. Regions, the location relation, and at least some material objects 
are plausibly fundamental, so, by any recombination principle that allows 
fundamental entities to be freely recombined, the colocation of x and y at r 
at t is not going to require anything about where x and y were located at 
earlier times, or that either of them has time travelled to r at t, or whether 
there even is anything outside of r at t.27  
So, facts about colocation at some time do not seem to obtain in 
virtue of facts about what is going on at other times. Since cases of self-
colocation are ipso facto cases of colocation, a suitable analysis of self-
colocation ought to allow that self-colocation at some time obtains only in 
virtue of facts about what is going on at that same time. Therefore, the 
strategy of appealing to Casper’s history is not a plausible route to securing 
an account of self-colocation.  
One could resist this argument by claiming that independence of 
facts about other times is a feature of paradigmatic cases of colocation, but 
not a feature of all cases, and in particular not cases of self-colocation. But 
this move is costly, because self-colocation cases already deviate from 
                                               
26 My thanks to the many readers who pressed versions of this objection.  
27 This argument is based on the recombinatorial arguments in Sider (2000) and Brzozowski (2008). 
Cf. the recombinatorial arguments in McDaniel (2007a-b) and Saucedo (2011).  
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paradigmatic cases of colocation in virtue of involving just one object,28 and 
the less these cases resemble paradigmatic cases of colocation, the less 
plausible it is to claim that these are instances of colocation at all.  
 
5 A More Promising Endurantist Solution 
 
Though we haven’t yet found a solution for the endurantist, I think 
that the foregoing discussion suggests a more promising - and very 
different - way forward. In light of the failure of all the strategies we have 
considered, it’s plausible that the history strategy gets this much right: the 
only difference between a mundane case in which Casper is singularly 
located at r1 at t2 without time-traveling (etc.), on the one hand, and the 
time travel case that has been the focus of our attention, on the other hand, 
is Casper’s history. But as we just saw, this history is probably not enough 
to take what would otherwise be a mundane case of singular location and 
turn it into a case of self-colocation. So maybe what the endurantist should 
say is that, even in the time travel case, Casper is merely singularly located 
at r1 at t2. 
More generally, I propose that the endurantist should interpret cases 
of time traveling objects that appear to colocate with themselves as cases of 
singular location in the midst of strange time travel adventures. The story 
goes something like this. At t1, Casper is multilocated. And when younger 
Casper begins to interpenetrate older Casper, they remain multilocated 
while they occupy distinct but overlapping regions. But at the moment 
when younger Casper comes to occupy r1 at t2, Casper is no longer either 
multilocated or interpenetrating himself. Rather, Casper is merely 
singularly located at r1 at t2. Now authors who have discussed these cases 
agree that, e.g., Casper will retain the properties of both older Casper and 
younger Casper even when he passes through himself. This means that 
Casper will have two different velocities when he is located at r1 at t2. 
                                               
28 May thanks to the various readers who made this point or closely related points.  
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Therefore, at the next moment, t3, Casper will multilocate again, heading 
off in two different directions at once.29 
The question remains how Casper can have apparently incompatible 
properties at the same place and time. For suppose younger Casper has 
velocity v1 and older Casper has a distinct velocity v2. It’s tempting to 
reason that, if younger Casper has velocity v1, then he doesn’t have velocity 
v2 like older Casper does, and so by Leibniz’s law younger Casper is 
distinct from older Casper. Of course, this is not a unique problem for the 
interpretation of self-colocation cases that I am recommending, since the 
same argument can be run on the assumption that Casper is genuinely self-
colocated. In fact, this problem has been the focus of attention in most 
previous discussions of self-colocation (Gilmore 2004, Carroll 2011, 
Wasserman 2018, Simon 2019). But one might worry that my account of 
what is going on in Casper’s situation makes this problem much harder to 
solve.30 For example, I can’t say that velocity v1 is instantiated by a different 
Casper-shaped object than v2 is, since I’ve argued that there is just one 
Casper-shaped object at r1 at t2. Nor can I relativize v1 and v2 to different 
hyperlocations or personal times, since I rejected similar appeals above. So 
what is the endurantist to do?  
My preferred solution to this problem was first suggested - but not 
endorsed - by Sider (2001, 102) and was later advocated by Wasserman 
(2005 & 2018, 203) and Carroll (201l, 366-9). Since it has been discussed 
before, I will be brief about it here. The strategy is to deny the premise that, 
if younger Casper has velocity v1, then he does not have velocity v2. Even 
without relativizing these velocities to different indices of some sort - a 
strategy that both Carroll and Wasserman consider and reject - this premise 
is neither a logical truth nor a consequence of Leibniz’s law. So there is room 
to contend, as Carroll and Wasserman do, that certain apparently 
incompatible pairs of properties like different bodily positions, weights, 
and velocities turn out to be compatible after all. Both authors argue that 
                                               
29 Cf. Wasserman’s (2018, 200-203) discussion of a self-colocated boson.  
30 A referee raised this worry.  
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the properties in each pair, though not co-instantiated in ordinary 
circumstances, are co-instantiated in certain unusual circumstances, but we 
tend to generalize from the former and so mistakenly conclude that the 
property pairs are incompatible. In reality, they are not incompatible at all.  
So I think the endurantist should deny that Casper is self-colocated. 
More generally, the cases in the literature which have been dubbed cases of 
self-colocation or spooky coincidence are not, in fact, special cases of 
colocation or coincidence at all. They are merely cases of singular location 
in strange contexts. 
Moreover, the endurantist can offer a plausible debunking story 
about why it seems to some philosophers that cases like Casper’s are cases 
of self-colocation. For it’s natural to think of spatially separated objects with 
apparently incompatible properties as distinct objects, even if, in the special 
case of a backward time traveler, the endurantist will say that they are not 
distinct after all. For that reason, it is easy slip into thinking about younger 
and older Casper as though they were distinct objects, and therefore 
younger Casper colocates with older Casper when older Casper passes 
through him. So, the idea that Casper self-colocates is ultimately based on 
a natural and tempting mistake in reasoning about backward time 
travelers.   
I conclude that the endurantist can give an adequate account of what 
is going on in cases of apparent self-colocation. But to do so, she must deny 
that apparent cases of self-colocation are genuine cases of self-colocation.31 
  
                                               
31 Thanks to Joshua Spencer, who helped me to develop the colocation puzzle and served as my 
mentor throughout the project. His suggestions show up throughout the paper in too many places to 
tag individually. Thanks to Phil Bricker, Joshua Spencer, and a referee for helping me to see that 
the puzzle could be framed as a problem primarily for the endurantist. Thanks also to Cody Gilmore, 
Stan Husi, William Wainwright, Blain Neufeld, the participants in Blain’s 2016 writing workshop, 
and various referees and editors for helpful discussion and/or written comments. Again, their 
suggestions show up throughout the paper in too many places to tag individually.  
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